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This paper explores the role of export costs in the 
process of poverty reduction in rural Africa. The authors 
claim that the marketing costs that emerge when the 
commercialization of export crops requires intermediaries 
can lead to lower participation into export cropping 
and, thus, to higher poverty. They test the model using 
data from the Uganda National Household Survey. 
The findings show that: i) farmers living in villages 
with fewer outlets for sales of agricultural exports are 
likely to be poorer than farmers residing in market-
endowed villages; ii) market availability leads to increased 
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household participation in export cropping (coffee, tea, 
cotton, fruits); and iii) households engaged in export 
cropping are less likely to be poor than subsistence-based 
households. The authors conclude that the availability 
of markets for agricultural export crops helps realize 
the gains from trade. This result uncovers the role of 
complementary factors that provide market access and 
reduce marketing costs as key building blocks in the link 
between the gains from export opportunities and the 
poor.Realizing the Gains from Trade: Export Crops,
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Trade costs, which include international transportation costs, transaction costs, and
distribution costs in countries of origin, destination, and transit, are an important barrier
to trade. Estimates from Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) and Hummels (1998) indicate
that these costs can in fact be much larger than tariﬀs and other trade policy barriers. Even
in places where formal trade barriers are almost fully eliminated, trade costs still remain as
strong barriers to exports and imports.
Trade costs prevent the full realization of the gains from trade. In developing countries,
these costs can also wither the poverty alleviation role of export opportunities.1 In addition,
some of the costs associated with exports, and thus the impacts of trade on incomes
and poverty, depend to a large extent on complementary domestic factors like improved
infrastructure, adequate competition policies and, especially in Africa, enhanced access to
credit, better education and health, and low marketing or intermediation costs.
In this paper, we explore the costs of trade for domestic producers when exporting
requires intermediaries, a widespread phenomenon in many developing countries. The need
for intermediaries in export activities can generate wide marketing costs in agriculture.2 The
focus of our investigation is intermediation costs in export crops, like coﬀee, tea and cotton,
in rural Uganda. Speciﬁcally, we claim here that, in rural Uganda, the lack of local outlets
for export crops (coﬀee, tea, cotton) raises their marketing costs, prevents the adoption of
high-return crops in favor of subsistence crops (maize, matooke), and impedes farmers to
take full advantage of high export prices and enhanced market access opportunities abroad.3
We begin by developing a model of agricultural production with marketing costs. The
1See the reviews in Winters, McCulloch and Mckay (2004) and Goldberg and Pavcnic (2004, 2006).
2These marketing costs are non-traditional trade costs like those in Limao and Venables (2001), who
analyze trade costs beyond transportation costs. They show that the total cost of transportation depends
on the level of infrastructure of trading partners.
3There is an increasing interest in these complementarities between trade and domestic factors. Three
recent edited volumes on trade and poverty, Harrison (2007), Hertel and Winters (2006), and Hoekman
and Olarreaga (2007), testiﬁes to this. A few more speciﬁc examples include Porto (2005), who shows that
informal barriers to trade have signiﬁcant eﬀects on poverty in Moldova; Welch, McMillan, and Rodrik
(2003), who argue that the negative impacts of the liberalization of the cashew sector in Mozambique was
mainly due to the structure of the internal markets; and Nicita (2006), who studies policies that facilitate
the transmission of international prices to the household in Mexico.
1model shows how farmers may be prevented from engaging in exporting activities, and
thus from earning higher income, when local marketing costs are too high. We then test
this hypothesis using farming data from Uganda (the Uganda National Household Survey).
We combine household-level information on income, poverty and exporting activities with
village-level measures of availability of local agricultural export markets. These markets
include a variety of outlets: standard district markets and road stalls; export intermediaries
(truck services and farmgate buyers); and foreign direct investment in the form of coﬀee or
tea plantations.
Our empirical analysis establishes a negative relationship between local availability
of export markets and poverty: controlling for all the relevant household and district
determinants and taking account of endogeneity issues, we ﬁnd that the presence of export
markets leads to lower poverty in rural Uganda. We explore the exports mechanism behind
this link: we ﬁnd that export markets acts as a facilitator of export agriculture cropping
(households may be prevented from entering export cash cropping if trading costs are too
high) and that poverty among producers of export crops is lower than poverty among
subsistence farmers (major export crops have higher returns than food crops). Overall, we
establish that lower export marketing costs induce export crop participation, which raises
household income and decreases the likelihood of poverty. This indicates the presence of a
poverty-reducing market access eﬀect.
It is not surprising that domestic factors aﬀect poverty and agricultural earnings. The
merit of our investigation is the ﬁnding of complementarities between those domestic factors
and the export opportunities: without domestic factors, the gains from trade may not be
realizable but, without exports, some domestic factors may become less relevant for poverty
alleviation. In addition, we identify one speciﬁc, and potentially important, factor among
these complementarities, namely the marketing costs of export crops.4 Hence, the Uganda
case is an instance where the standard prescriptions of education and health policies could be
combined with more speciﬁc measures to encourage the development of local export markets
in a successful attempt towards poverty reduction.
4See Collier and Gunning (1999) for a thorough description of several major constraints to development
in Africa.
2The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop a model of export choice and
marketing costs. In section 3, we describe the Uganda household survey and we introduce
our marketing costs hypothesis. In section 4, we explain the empirical strategy and discuss
results. In Section 5, we provide robustness checks and sensitivity analysis. Section 6
concludes.
2 A Model of Marketing Costs and Exports
We begin by laying out a simple model of export crop participation with marketing costs.
Farmers, who are endowed with one unit of land, must decide whether to specialize in the
production of food crops or export crops. Specialization in export crops delivers a physical
output of A per unit of land. Farmers are heterogeneous in land quality, ability in crop
husbandry, ﬁxed assets and labor endowment. To capture this exogenous heterogeneity
across farmers, we let output A follow a density function f with support [0,∞). In contrast,
specialization in food crops has a homogeneous return of R per unit of land.5 The relative
price of export crops to food crops is denoted by p.
Food crops and export crops diﬀer in their marketability. Food crops are used for own
consumption or can be marketed at no cost. To simplify the analysis, we assume that there
is a fringe of food producers that supply food crops at a constant marginal cost. These food
producers are arbitrage food traders, landless individuals working on public land or farmers
who cannot meet the ﬁxed costs of export participation (in scale, know-how, etc.). This
assumption allows us to pin down the price of food, which we thereby set to one.6
Marketing export crops is costly. We assume that export activities are carried out by
5This is a simplifying assumption. If R depends on household characteristics, all the results remain
qualitatively unchanged but the model becomes less tractable.
6The assumptions of complete specialization in production and of the existence of a fringe of food
production at constant marginal cost simplify the model. In a diﬀerent technological environment, with
decreasing returns for instance, some farmers will end up in an interior solution with positive production of
both food and export crops. This just complicates the computation of the expected export output without
adding further insights. On the other hand, in the absence of the fringe food production, the expansion
of export cropping may cause food supply to decline and food price to increase. This will prevent some
farmers at the margin from specializing in exports. While these dynamics seem interesting to explore, our
qualitative conclusion from the model—that lower trading costs lead to more export participation and lower
poverty—are not aﬀected by them.
3intermediaries that purchase the export crop locally and sell it internationally. Farmers
who choose to produce export crops need to transport and market their output to the local
intermediaries, who are in turn in charge of shipping output to international markets.
The economy is composed of many districts. For simplicity, we assume that farmers
need to sell their export crop output to an intermediary in their own district. A district
is represented by a unit circle. Farmers are uniformly distributed along the circle with a
measure of L farmers at each point in the circle. There is a ﬁnite number of intermediaries,
n, who are located symmetrically along the same circle, at a distance of 1/n from each other.
The distance between farmers and intermediaries determines the marketing (transport) costs.
A farmer that is located at a distance x from a given intermediary incurs a marketing cost
of δx per unit of output.
Intermediaries have market power and compete in prices. Farmers are small and take
prices from the diﬀerent intermediaries as given. Once farmers get a draw A from f, they
make two decisions: (1) whether to produce food or export crops; (2) to which intermediary
to sell the output of the export crop. The decision sequence is solved backwards. First, each
farmer ﬁnds the intermediary i that oﬀers him the best “price-distance” combination, i.e.,
the maximum net price (pi −δxi). Let (p,x) denote the best price-distance combination for
a given farmer. Given (p,x) and the output level A, the farmer chooses to produce export
crops or food crops. Farmers with (p − δx)A ≥ R specialize in export crops, while farmers
with (p − δx)A < R specialize in food crops. We can thus deﬁne an export specialization
cutoﬀ e A, the level of output that leaves a farmer indiﬀerent between cropping activities,
given by (p − δx) e A(p,x) = R.
Expected supply of export crops at a price-distance combination (p,x) is obtained by







e A(p,x) Af(A)dA; p − δx > 0
0 p − δx ≤ 0.
Intermediaries buy export crops from farmers at the price p, and sell the crops in international
markets at the exogenous international price, P ∗. The cost of transporting crops from a
4district to the international market is given by
(2) C = D + dQ,
where D is a ﬁxed cost of intermediation, Q is the total quantity of export crops that an
intermediary buys from all farmers, and d is the unitary transport cost to ship output from
the center of the district (given by the center of the circle) to international markets. Surplus
is given by (P ∗ − d − p)Q − D. There is free entry until proﬁts from the intermediation
activity are zero. The location choice is exogenous.
A given intermediary i chooses a price pi taking competition as given. Since intermediaries
are symmetric, they charge the same price in equilibrium. We can thus summarize the
competition faced by intermediary i by the price charged by his competitors, p0, and by the




∗ − d − pi)Q(pi,p0,n) − D.
To solve the maximization problem, we need to construct the total supply faced by
intermediary i, Q(pi,p0,n). Because of the symmetry in prices, we only need to consider
the two contiguous competitors, which are located at a distance of 1/n to the left and to
the right of i. Let x denote the distance between intermediary i and a farmer located to his
right. This farmer is located at a distance 1/n − x from the right competitor. Given the
prices charged by i and by the right competitor, pi and p0, we can deﬁne a cutoﬀ distance
e x so that the farmer located at e x is indiﬀerent between the two intermediaries. The cutoﬀ
distance is deﬁned by pi − δe x(pi,p0,n) = p0 − δ
 
1
n − e x(pi,p0,n)

; with







Farmers at a distance x ≤ e x(pi,p0,n) sell to intermediary i and farmers at a distance
x > e x(pi,p0,n) sell to the right competitor.
Total supply faced by an intermediary i from farmers located to the right and to the
5left is obtained by integrating the expected supply deﬁned in (1) over farmers at distances
between zero and e x. This yields




The situation is depicted in Figure 1. The base and height of the rectangle represent the
two dimensions of heterogeneity among farmers: location and potential output from export
crops. Distance to intermediary i is measured in the horizontal axis, with the largest possible
distance being 1/n, and output on the vertical axis. Prices are given. Farmers to the right
of e x choose the competitor’s price-distance combination (although some of them might end
up choosing to specialize in food crops). Farmers to the left of e x choose the price-distance
combination oﬀered by intermediary i. Among the latter, those farmers with lower potential
output from export crops (A < e A) specialize in food crops, and those with higher potential
output (A ≥ e A) specialize in export crops and constitute the supply faced by intermediary i.
The cutoﬀ output level e A depends on distance. Farmers that are closer to the intermediary
need to cover lower transportation costs, therefore, they require a lower level of output to
ﬁnd export crops more proﬁtable than food crops.
Intermediaries choose prices to maximize proﬁts deﬁned in (3) taking the prices of the
competitors as given and subject to the supply function deﬁned in (5). In equilibrium all
intermediaries charge the same price. For a given number of intermediaries n, the proﬁt
maximizing ﬁrst order condition evaluated at equilibrium prices p is (dropping subindex i)
(6) −Q(p,p0,n)|p0=p + (P




The number of intermediaries n is determined endogenously by the free-entry, zero-proﬁt
condition. This is
(7) (P
∗ − d − p)Q(p,p0,n)|p0=p − D = 0.
Equations (6) and (7), subject to the supply function in (5), deﬁne the equilibrium prices p
6and number of competitors n.
To characterize the equilibrium, we need to impose some structure on the density function
of export crop yields. In Figure 2, we explore the case of an exponential distribution of A.
The combinations of prices and number of intermediaries that satisfy the proﬁt maximization
condition (6) are positively sloped. More intermediaries n means more competition so that
the proﬁt maximizing price oﬀered to farmers is higher. The combination of prices and
intermediaries that satisfy the zero proﬁt condition (7) is negatively sloped. Lower prices
oﬀered to farmers mean higher proﬁts so that more intermediaries can aﬀord to pay the ﬁxed
costs and enter the market. The equilibrium prices and number of competitors are given by
the intersection point E.7
The model delivers several predictions that we test in sections 4 and 5. Our main
hypothesis is that households residing in districts with a larger number of intermediaries,
and thus with lower marketing costs for export crops, are less likely to be poor; that the
choice to produce export crops is in part explained by the presence of intermediaries; and
that the choice to produce export crops in part explains the lower likelihood of poverty. In
the model, we can establish these results by comparing two districts with diﬀerent number
of intermediaries.8 Given the equilibrium symmetric price oﬀered by all intermediaries and





; hence, the probability that a random farmer, anywhere in the circle,
produce export crops can be derived after integration over x










In Appendix A, we show that, conditional on the price p, this probability is increasing in the
number of intermediaries n. This is because the presence of more intermediaries reduces the
average distance from farmers to intermediaries and thus decreases average marketing costs.
7Similar equilibria can be found for other functions f such as the Pareto distribution (which is often used
in productivity analysis). Notice that an equilibrium with entry may not exist (for example in the case of a
low international price P∗ and large costs of access to international markets D and d). See below.
8Notice that these are not comparative static results because n is an endogenous variable (see below
for a discussion of some exogenous variables that determine p and n in equilibrium). In fact, this analysis
highlights the endogeneity issues that we tackle in our empirical work.
7In consequence, a larger number of farmers will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to specialize in export crops.
Further, this implies that the expected income of the farmer increases in n and thus that







where q(x,p)/L is the expected output of export crops by a typical farmers (equation (1)).
Integrating over x, the expected income of a random farmer is














We prove in Appendix A that Y (·) is indeed increasing in n. For our purposes, these results
establish a relationship between lower marketing costs in export cropping and lower poverty
in rural areas.
In our empirical work, we will exploit regional variation in the number of intermediaries
to explore the relationship between export marketing costs, export adoption, and poverty.
The model can be used to think about exogenous determinants of the equilibrium number
of intermediaries. Both p and n depend on parameters that are common to all districts,
like the international price (P ∗), and parameters that can vary across districts, like the
out-of-district cost of access to international markets (D and d), district size (L), and the
distribution of returns to export cropping. Therefore, diﬀerences in the primitive parameters
across districts will generate diﬀerences in prices and in the number of intermediaries. For
practical purposes, this implies that we can use some of these exogenous parameters, such
as the out-of-district cost of transportation to international markets,9 as valid instruments
in the instrumental variables speciﬁcations of the model (sections 4 and 5).
One last feature of the model that deserves emphasis is the interrelation between
marketing costs and export opportunities in poverty reduction. The claims in this paper are
that exports matter for poverty alleviation provided marketing costs are low enough, and
that low marketing costs are not necessarily conducive to poverty alleviation in the absence of
export opportunities. It is the combination of export opportunities (for example, through a
high international price) and domestic conditions (through low marketing costs) that works.
9This is an out-of-district cost and must not be confused with marketing costs within a district.
8To see this, notice that, for given intermediation costs, a suﬃciently low international price
can make the Proﬁt Maximization and the Zero Proﬁt loci not to cross in the positive orthant.
Similarly, even if the international price is high, prohibitive marketing costs can lead to an
autarky equilibrium with farmers specialized in low-return food crops. In this situation, high
marketing costs prevent farmers from realizing the gains from exports.
3 The Uganda National Household Survey
To test the relationship between marketing costs, export cropping, and poverty, we work
with the 1999/2000 Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS). The data are a large-scale
household survey conducted by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics that covers the entire
country, rural and urban areas. The sampling design is a stratiﬁed two-stage sampling.
The ﬁrst stage units are the Enumerator Areas of the 1991 Population Census and the
second stage units are the households.
There are two sets of data in the UNHS: household data and community data. From the
household data we construct measures of poverty and export participation at the household
level. With the community data, we construct a measure of marketing costs at the district
level.
The household-level data include socio-economic and enterprise modules. There
are modules related to household characteristics (household composition, demographics),
activity status, health, education, and housing amenities. There are also questions on
consumption expenditure and sources of income (farm and non-farm activities, employment,
remittances), and a crop module with questions on land allocation, production, sales,
home-consumption, etc. Samples statistics are reported in Table 1.
To determine the poverty status of each household, we use the expenditure module and
compare household expenditures with poverty lines. We use the head count as a measure
of poverty whereby a household with a per capita expenditure below the poverty line is
considered poor. Average per capita expenditure in rural Uganda was 16.48 U.S. dollars per
month (23,022 Uganda Shillings). Rural poverty lines for each province were constructed by
9Appleton (1999). The average poverty line for rural areas was 15.6 U.S. dollars per month
(21,790 Ugandan Shillings), or 0.52 cents per day. The national poverty rate in 1999 was 35
percent.
In Africa, poverty is widespread and it is important to understand its determinants
and ways to eradicate it. Looking at poverty is more revealing than looking at household
expenditure or income. While it is possible to test whether trade aﬀects the income of rich
Ugandan households, our analysis is tailored to explore impacts among the most vulnerable
group of the population.
Households do not export directly but we can infer their export-related activities from
the crops they grow. We divide crops into two groups, export crops and food crops. The
division is based on aggregate data on Ugandan exports, reported in Table 2. Major export
commodities are coﬀee, cotton, tea, and tobacco, and other non-traditional products such as
ﬁsh, fruits, and ﬂowers. In the crop questionnaire of the Uganda National Household Survey,
prevailing export crops are coﬀee, tea, cotton, pineapples, and passion fruits.10 Food crops
include matooke (banana), maize, sweet potatoes, sorghum. Food crops are mostly destined
to home consumption.
In our analysis, we aggregate all the export crops into one export crop activity. While
there may be diﬀerences across crops that can be worth exploring, our data are not rich
enough to conduct a detailed disaggregated analysis. In the empirical work, we exploit
regional disparities in export adoption, poverty, and marketing costs as identifying variation.
Figure 3 gives an overview of regional disparities in export crops in Uganda based on
information from the UNHS and FAO. The ﬁgure includes four panels, each one of them
depicting the prevalence of diﬀerent crops in diﬀerent regions. The top-left map reveals that
coﬀee is mostly produced in the center of the country and in mountainous regions in the
Southwest, West, Northwest, and East. Tea (top-right map) is produced in the South, the
Center, and in some Northern regions. Cotton (bottom-left panel) is the major crop of the
Northern provinces; there is some cotton production in the Southwest and Southeast as well.
Finally, fruits, like passion fruits and pineapples, are grown in the Center, the Northwest
10Other export products, like vanilla, ﬁsh or ﬂowers, are not signiﬁcant in the 1999/2000 data.
10and the Southwest.
To quantify export participation at the household level, we use two deﬁnitions, the share
of land allocated to export crops and the share of income derived from export crops. The
average plot size in the data was 2.57 acres (Table 1). Around 7 percent of household land
is allocated to export crops; around 8 percent of household income is derived from the sale
of these crops. Participation in export agriculture is in fact limited in Uganda. It is our aim
to explore to what extent this is due to high export marketing costs.
Our measure of marketing costs in export agriculture comes from the community module.
The community module collects information on community characteristics at the level of
enumerator areas (the ﬁrst stage sampling units). In our regression analysis, we use this
information aggregated at the district level, excluding urban areas.
As suggested by the model of section 2, marketing costs are closely related to the extent
of intermediation activity, given by the presence of outlets where farmers can sell their export
crops. There are three diﬀerent types of such markets in rural Uganda.11 First, the most
widespread way of marketing export crops is through export intermediaries. These are agents
that purchase output from farmers, store the production and then transport the agricultural
produce with pick-ups or small trucks to Kampala, the capital of Uganda. Second, typical
outlets for cash crop are district markets or stalls along the road to Kampala. Third, an
additional channel to sell agricultural produce is through large commercial plantations,
particularly of coﬀee and tea. These plantations often purchase the output of neighbor
farmers thereby constituting additional channels of market availability. Most plantations
are run by foreign ﬁrms.
The community module provides information on whether there is at least one of the
three types of outlets available in each community.12 Since communities are very small and
farmers can in principle easily commercialize their products in neighboring communities, we
construct a measure of market density at the district level. There are several communities
(enumerator areas) in each district, and in each community the availability of markets is a
11The survey asks separate questions on availability of food markets where farmers can sell the production
surplus of food crops. This means that the availability of agricultural produce markets refers to commodity
markets and cash crops like coﬀee, tea, and cotton.
12There is no information on the speciﬁc type of outlet or on the number of outlets
11dichotomous variable. We deﬁne export market density as the fraction of communities in a
given district in which there is at least one market for export crops available. Market density
captures the extent of intermediation activity in a district (including intermediaries in the
strict sense, road markets, and plantations). In districts were market density is higher, it is
easier for farmers to commercialize their export crops and marketing costs are lower.
At the national level, the average market density is 0.37 (Table 3). This means that, on
average, in 37 percent of the communities there is at least one outlet for agricultural produce,
namely intermediaries, export crop stalls, or local large plantations. Instead, the prevalence
of surplus food markets (sweet potatoes, bananas, tomatoes) is much higher: average food
market density reaches 0.76.
Table 3 reports other important measures of community infrastructure that we use in
our regression analysis. In the community module, there are questions on distance to paved
roads; dichotomous access to infrastructure variables such as access to credit, improved
seeds, oxen use and rental, tractors, extension services; major village constraints in terms of
input markets, roads, disease, security, land, credit, land fertility; and indicators of access to
veterinary services, existence of land conﬂict, availability of communal land, primary school,
free medicine, water services, public hospital, and private hospitals. We use all these control
variables in the regression estimation.
4 Estimation and Results
Our testing hypothesis is that a farmer faced with the decision to adopt a higher-return
export crop is more likely to participate, therefore being less likely to be poor, when access
to export markets is less costly. This is because better access to export markets facilitates
trade and lowers marketing costs. In our analysis, we use market density as a measure of
access to export markets at the district level.
Figure 4 takes a ﬁrst look at the data to establish descriptive correlations between the
three variables of interest: market density, exports and poverty. The ﬁrst panel plots the
estimates of a non-parametric regression between poverty and market density (using Fan
12locally kernel weighted linear regressions with a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 0.15).
We see that the relationship is negative, with lower poverty associated with higher market
density. Notice that the relationship is quite strong when there are few markets available
but debilitates at high market density.
The second panel displays the non-parametric correlation between export market density
and export crop participation. The solid line corresponds to the share of land allocated
to export crops and the broken line, to the share of export crops in income. As our
hypothesis suggests, the graph reveals that the availability of markets for agriculture produce
is positively linked to export cropping. Finally, the third panel displays the relationship
between poverty and export crop participation. As argued, the graph reveals that a higher
participation in export agriculture is associated with a lower likelihood of poverty.
The graphical representation of the relationship between market density, export cropping,
and poverty is a descriptive tool. In what follows, we approach the issue from a formal
regression analysis of each of the three correlations illustrated in Figure 4. The econometric
model takes other controls and reverse causality issues into account.
4.1 An Econometric Model of Market Density and Poverty
We begin by investigating the relationship between poverty and export marketing costs,
which are inversely related to export market density. We set up the following regression
model







where Phc is a dichotomous variable that indicates the poverty status of household h in
district c, Mc is export market density in district c, prc is an export price index in district
c, and xhc and zc are household and district characteristics. Market density captures the
three marketing channels described in the previous section: i) intermediaries; ii) export crop
market stalls; iii) large scale plantations. Estimates of α1 will reveal how poverty is aﬀected
by marketing costs in exports.
13The model includes a large set of controls. The vector xhc includes household
characteristics: size, demographic composition, age and gender of the household head, the
level of education and literacy of the head, and his/her health status. We also include
a full set of district variables, zc, that measure social and economic infrastructure. The
district controls are the variables described in Table 3. They include access to credit, roads,
equipment (oxen, tractors), inputs, and extension services, indicators of major agricultural
constraints (land quality, land availability, input availability, diseases), educational, medical,
sanitary and veterinary infrastructure, and prevalence of security and conﬂicts. This
extensive set of district controls is important to purge the regression from district eﬀects
that may confound the eﬀects of export market density. For instance, the district controls
account for diﬀerences in district economic (roads, equipment, credit) and social (health)
infrastructure that can simultaneously aﬀect the level of poverty, export crop adoption and
market density. Similarly, these variables will control for social conﬂict and security, which
might be conducive to lower poverty and lower export participation. This is especially
important in some parts of Northern Uganda.13 Further, they account for potential
bio-climatic diﬀerences in the country by controlling for diﬀerences in input availability
(land, variable inputs) and the average quality of land.
An important control in our regression is the export price index, which serves several
purposes. As described in the model of section 2, diﬀerences in intermediation activity
across districts (i.e., diﬀerences in market density) are associated with diﬀerences in export
marketing costs and with diﬀerences in the prices oﬀered to the farmers. Market density is
an imperfect measure of marketing costs in exports and could include traces of price eﬀects.
It is thus important to control for prices to isolate the true eﬀects of marketing costs on
poverty.
To construct the price index, we proceed as follows. Households that produce export
crops report unit values for their sales, which approximate the producer prices net of
marketing costs (p − δx in the model of Section 2). Given the price p oﬀered by the
intermediaries, diﬀerences in unit values across households within a district are explained
13Other Northern districts, where conﬂict is more widespread, are excluded from the regressions.
14mostly by marketing costs, δx. Since we want to separate the eﬀect of prices from the eﬀects
of export marketing costs, we need to control for the price oﬀered by the intermediaries in
a district, p (and not for the reported p − δx, which varies at the household level). To do
this, we approximate the price p with the price faced by the farmer with the lowest possible
marketing cost (x = 0 in the model), that is, the farmer with the highest observed unit value.
For robustness against outliers, we use the 75th percentile of the distribution of household
unit values in each district as a measure of p. Finally, since we are pooling together diﬀerent
export crops (coﬀee, cotton, tea, passion fruits and pineapples), the export price index is a
weighted average of the 75th percentile log unit values of each of these crops, with weights
given by the average share of land allocated to each crop in the district.
Notice that export prices and the weights attached to them play another important
function. As shown in Figure 3, farmers in diﬀerent regions tend to specialize in diﬀerent
export crops. Since these crops sell at diﬀerent prices, specialization in diﬀerent export crops
can lead to diﬀerent poverty impacts. These regional diﬀerences in proﬁtability across export
crops can be controlled for with the weights used in the construction of the export price,
that is, the shares of each export crop.
Even after controlling for all these confounding factors, the major econometric concern
with regression (10) is the reverse causality between poverty and market density. Poverty
is lower when marking costs are lower, and markets may develop in richer districts. We
need instruments that are exogenous determinants of market density and that vary by
district. The model of section 2 suggests that good candidates are the costs of intermediation
activity, such as the out-of-district transportation cost from each district to international
markets, represented in the model by d and D. Out-of-district transportation costs indicate
how diﬃcult it is for intermediaries to reach export destinations. It is a fundamental
determinant of the proﬁtability of intermediation activities in export crops, either in the form
of intermediaries in the strict sense, market stalls, or plantations, and thus a determinant of
market density, our endogenous variable.
In Uganda, a landlocked country, most international shipments must go through the
capital, Kampala. We proxy the out-of-district transportation costs with district level data
15on transportation costs from the center of each district to Kampala. These costs are reported
in the community questionnaire of the Uganda National Household Survey as the monetary
cost of reaching Kampala by car/truck.14
This strategy requires a careful control of the regression so as to make sure that
out-of-district transportation costs do not have a direct eﬀect on the left-hand side variable
(poverty). In our regression model, there are two sets of such controls. A major control is
the export price index. Under imperfect competition among intermediaries, out-of-district
transportation costs are borne both by intermediaries (directly) and by farmers (via lower
prices). In districts where out-of-district transportation costs are lower, the proﬁts of
intermediation are higher, more intermediaries enter, and farmers enjoy higher prices and
are less likely to be poor. For the instrument to satisfy the exclusion restriction, we need to
control for the fraction of the out-of-district transportation costs that are borne by farmers.
We achieve this by including the export price index, which summarizes farmer prices and
includes the pass-through of out-of-district transportation costs. After including the price
index, there is no direct eﬀect of out-of-district transportation costs on poverty via cost
pass-through.
The other set of controls comprises all district characteristics that could be aﬀected
by out-of-district transport costs and that could have an eﬀect on poverty. Districts
with lower out-of-district transport costs to Kampala could be less poor due to improved
infrastructure, higher local development, and better institutional quality. This eﬀect is also
already controlled for in regression (10) with the extensive set of districts characteristics
included in z.15 After including producer prices and district characteristics in the model, all
the channels through which out-of-district transport costs could aﬀect poverty are accounted
for.
As a robustness check, we also include an additional district control, the density of food
markets, deﬁned analogously to export market density. These markets are less sophisticated
than agriculture produce markets (coﬀee stalls, intermediaries and plantations) and are thus
14In this section, we estimate the model using one instrumental variable for our endogenous regressor. In
section 5, we provide a sensitivity analysis by estimating the model with an additional instrument.
15These include access variables (to credit, roads, equipment, inputs, and extension services), agricultural
constraints (land quality, land availability), social infrastructure (education, health), security and conﬂicts.
16more ordinary. This variable controls for the thickness of food markets (and thus accounts
for food risk). In fact, in Uganda, food markets are fairly common whenever there are paved
or tarred roads. Food market density is a good aggregate indicator of district infrastructure
and development and could capture additional unobserved district characteristics.
The main results are shown in Table 4. In the ﬁrst panel, we report estimates from linear
IV regressions. The ﬁrst column corresponds to a simple linear model that only includes
households characteristics xhc as controls. We ﬁnd that market density, Mc, is negatively
and signiﬁcantly associated with poverty (b α1 = −0.56).16
In column (2) of Table 4, we add district characteristics and infrastructure variables, zc,
and the export crop price index, prc (Table A1 in Appendix B reports these estimates). The
negative association between export market density and poverty is robust to the inclusion of
these variables. Notice, however, that the addition of district variables has a sizeable impact
on the coeﬃcient of market density, which drops to −0.27. Export prices do not seem to
have a signiﬁcant impact on poverty (conditional on all the other controls).17
In column (3), we include food market density as an additional district variable to control
for further unobserved district eﬀects. We ﬁnd that poverty is negatively associated with
the presence of food markets, although the relationship is not as strong as expected. For
our purposes, however, the critical ﬁnding is that the negative association between export
market density and poverty still shows up strongly in the regressions; further, the magnitude
of the coeﬃcient, −0.28, does not change much with respect to Model 2 (which suggests
that there are no additional unobserved district eﬀects in the model). Our ﬁndings support
the hypothesis that households residing in districts endowed with more agriculture export
markets are, on average, less likely to be poor: increasing the density of export markets by
10 percentage points (from an average market density of 0.37—see Table 3) would cause
poverty to decline by 2.8 percentage points.
The validity of these results depends to a larger extent on the quality of the instrument.
We can assess how good our instrument is by looking at the ﬁrst stage regression, whereby
we regress the endogenous variable, market density, on the out-of-district transportation
16Since Mc varies at the district level, the estimation of the variance is corrected for clustering eﬀects.
17See the discussion at the end of the section.
17costs, household characteristics xhc, district level controls zc, the export price index, and
food markets (explanatory variables vary across columns as described above). We report the
main coeﬃcients at the bottom of the ﬁrst row panel in Table 4. Notice that our instrument
has good explanatory power in the ﬁrst stage regression: districts with lower transportation
costs to Kampala are endowed with more export markets. Further, the F-statistic is greater
than 10 in the three speciﬁcations, thus passing the test of weak instruments proposed by
Stock and Staiger (1997). Finally, the abrupt changes in the model when adding the district
controls and its stability when moving from Model 2 to Model 3 suggest that the district
eﬀects are accounted for, a requirement for consistency of the IV estimator. Notice, however,
that in these regressions exogeneity of the instruments has to be maintained and cannot be
tested. In section 5, we expand the set of instruments as part of our robustness checks and
we perform overidentiﬁcation tests of the model.
Since the poverty indicator P is a dichotomous variable, we set up Probit models of
poverty with endogenous regressors in addition to the linear models described above. We
work with a control function approach, which requires the inclusion of the residuals from the
ﬁrst stage regression, together with the endogenous variable, in the second stage regression
(Newey, 1987; Blundell and Powell, 2004). Results are reported in the second panel of Table
4. Our ﬁnding, that export market density is conducive to poverty reduction, is robust to
the Probit speciﬁcation. The magnitudes of the marginal eﬀects, equal to −0.35 in Model
3, are slightly higher, but comparable, to the linear case.
These major ﬁndings reveal how, conditional on oﬀered prices p, the prevalence of export
markets allows farmers to obtain a higher net price for their export output by enjoying lower
marketing costs. As more markets are available, doing export businesses becomes cheaper
and, consequently, poverty is lower. If prices are not included in the regression, we can
redeﬁne marketing costs to also include the cost of low competition among intermediaries (in
terms of lower oﬀered prices p). There are indications that this may be a plausible deﬁnition
in the case in Uganda. Figure 5, for instance, uncovers the strong positive association
between the export market density and the export price index. In this interpretation, lower
marketing costs could also lead to lower poverty via a price mechanism. We have explored
18this model by estimating Model 3 in Table 4 without the price index as regressor (thus
assuming Mc embeds both marketing costs, δx, and oﬀered prices p). Our ﬁndings remain
quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged and this suggests that the impacts of market
density that we ﬁnd in the data may comprise both transaction costs and price eﬀects.
4.2 The Exports Channel
We have established a causal relationship between marketing costs, as measured by market
density, and poverty. In this section we show that the adoption of export crops is
an important channel that explains this relationship: when marketing costs are lower,
households ﬁnd it proﬁtable to reallocate some resources from the production of home
consumption crops to higher-yield export crops. We ﬁrst show that export crops become
more prevalent when market density is higher; and later show that growing export crops
does indeed substantially help reduce poverty at the household level.
We begin by estimating the following regression model







where shc is the measure of export participation, deﬁned as the share of land allocated to
export crops and, alternatively, as the share of income derived from export crops, Mc is
market density, prc is the export crop price index, xs
hc are household controls, and zc are
district controls.18
As in the poverty model (10), market density may be endogenous to participation in
export markets. That is, more markets may develop in those districts where farmers are more
likely to grow export crops. To account for this, we use the out-of-district transportation cost
18It is important to look at both dependent variables—share of land and share of income—since they
reveal diﬀerent aspects of the decision to produce for exports. Land allocation is the most straightforward
indicator of participation because it measures the allocation of household capital to alternative uses. A
problem with measures of land allocation is that, depending on the crop, it may respond slowly to changes
in the independent variables. This is the case, for example, with tree crops like coﬀee or tea. In these
instances, it may be diﬃcult for farmers to switch from tree crops to food crops (or vice versa) after a change
in contemporaneous variables. However, farmers can adjust other inputs, like eﬀort or fertilizer. If coﬀee
prices are low, for instance, farmers may prefer to keep the trees but put less eﬀort or apply less fertilizer.
A better measure to account for these eﬀects is thus the share of income generated by the export crops.
19to international markets, measured as the cost of transportation to Kampala, as instrument
for Mc.19
We adopt the same three speciﬁcations as in (10) and report results in Table 5. Column
(1) corresponds to the simple model with only household controls. In column (2), we add
the measures of district infrastructure and other observed characteristics, as well as the
export price index, to control for confounding community eﬀects; in column (3) we add food
market density as a control. We ﬁnd very strong evidence that a higher export market
density induces farmers to participate more in export agriculture. This result holds for all
speciﬁcations. It also holds for our alternative measure of export cropping, namely the share
of income derived from them—see Table 6. This is an important result: improved trade
facilitation and lower export marketing costs matter for export crop participation. The
point estimate is b α2 = 0.18; an increase in export market density of 10 percentage points
would cause the average land share devoted to export crops to increase by 1.8 percentage
points, equivalent to 25 percent (one fourth) of the average export participation (around 7
percent in Table 1).
Since our two measures of export participation are shares that are left censored at 0 and
right censored at 1, we estimate Tobit models with a control function approach (to account
for the endogeneity of export market availability). As before, this requires that we include
the estimated residuals from the ﬁrst stage regression along with the endogenous variable and
the other exogenous regressors in a standard Tobit model. In the second panel of Table 5,
we show that our ﬁndings are robust to censoring of the export participation variables. The
coeﬃcients on market density are positive and highly signiﬁcant. Furthermore, the marginal
eﬀects of the Tobit estimates (the change in the unconditional average land share) is 0.18,
the same as the IV estimate in the ﬁrst panel.
Table 6 reproduces the structure of Table 5 but uses the alternative deﬁnition of export
crop participation, the share of income derived from cotton, tea, coﬀee, pineapples and
passion fruit. Our ﬁndings are robust to this deﬁnition.
We turn now to the last link in our hypothesis: whether, at the household level, the
19See Section 5 for results with an additional instrument.
20adoption of export crops is associated with lower probability of poverty. The regression
model is







where Phc is a dichotomous variable indicating poverty and shc is participation in export
activities (measured by share of land or share of income). Both variables are deﬁned at
the household level. We are mostly interested in estimates of α3, the coeﬃcient of export
participation. Notice that participation in export cropping may be endogenous to the poverty
status if, for instance, richer households are able to ﬁnance any start-up investments needed
to enter export markets. Also, richer households may have more educated heads, who may
be more productive in export crops. Our previous results suggest possible instruments for
export cropping, namely the out-of-district cost of transportation to Kampala.20
Table 7 shows the results from instrumental variable regressions for the two deﬁnitions
of export participation, the share of land and the share of income. The ﬁrst three columns
correspond to models of land shares, and the last three, to models of income shares. In
the ﬁrst row, we report results from linear IV models. In the second row, we report Probit
models with endogenous regressors (using the control function method).
Overall, the relationship between these variables is negative: households involved in the
production of export crops (like cotton, tea, coﬀee, fruits) are less likely to be poor than
households that are not involved in export markets. We ﬁnd that, indeed, lower marketing
costs encourage export participation and leads to lower poverty. For instance, doubling
export participation (from 7 percent land shares to 14 percent land shares) would reduce
poverty by 13 percentage points (using the point estimates of the Probit marginal eﬀects in
Model 3 of the land shares).
20It may be argued that this is not a good instrument because by using it as an instrument in equation
(11) it satisﬁes the exclusion restriction and is thus not correlated with the shares shc. This is not correct.
The instrument is, indeed, the predictions of M from the ﬁrst stage regression. In practice, in the linear
model, this is the same as using out-of-district transportation costs directly in the IV estimation.
215 Robustness and Sensitivity
In this section, we provide robustness checks and sensitivity analysis. Our main concern is
that the instrumental variables estimator has relied on the use of one instrument only. In
order to perform speciﬁcation tests, we redo the whole analysis using two instruments.
We add export market density in 1995 to our main instrument, that is, the out-of-district
cost of transportation to Kampala. This lag captures the fact that markets are sometimes
focal points that tend to perpetuate. Although it is fairly common to use lagged variables
as instruments, there are some concerns to address. First, it is important to ask if the same
correlation between market availability and poverty in t may be present between market
availability in t − T and poverty in t (where T is the number of year between household
surveys, 1999 and 1995 in this case). For instance, if there is autocorrelation in the residuals
in (10), then the endogeneity argument that invalidates the results from OLS may also
invalidate the results from the use of lagged instruments. Similarly, lagged instruments will
not work if there are persistent omitted variables. Here, we claim that the autocorrelation
in the errors becomes a second order problem. We are actually merging data from the 1999
UNHS with an instrument taken from the 1995 UNHS. Since there are four years between
these surveys, there is good reason to believe that the correlation will be practically absent.
Another problem is that, since our instrument varies across districts, the instrument is
required to be uncorrelated with all lags of the residuals, a requirement that might fail in
the presence of district ﬁxed eﬀects. Since we are accounting for district eﬀects by including
a comprehensive set of district controls zc, we argue that this requirement is met.
Results are reported in Table 8. The instruments work well, both according to the
predictive power in the ﬁrst stage regression and to the Hansen speciﬁcation test of
overidentifying restrictions. The magnitudes of the impacts are similar to those in previous
sections.
226 Conclusions
The main claim of this paper is that the way in which trade aﬀects poverty is shaped
by complementarities between export opportunities and domestic factors. In the presence of
export opportunities, such as high international prices for major export crops like coﬀee, tea,
cotton and fruits, the potential gains from exports may not be realizable if complementary
domestic factors are unavailable. In turn, some domestic factors, like infrastructure, may
become relatively ineﬀective in the absence of international markets. We have explored this
hypothesis by investigating the case of intermediation activities, marketing costs, export
crop adoption, and poverty in Uganda.
Our ﬁndings make two contributions to the related literature. We generate direct evidence
that exports matter for poverty reduction: farmers that are able to adopt high-yield export
crops are on average less poor than farmers more oriented towards subsistence activities.
Further, we provide direct evidence of the importance of complementary policies to the
realization of the gains from trade: trade costs matter for poverty reduction because
high trade costs prevent farmers from adopting major export crops. This is mostly a
transaction costs argument whereby the presence of export markets facilitates the marketing
of export crops and allows farmers to fetch a higher net price for their output. The analysis
reveals traces of a price eﬀect as well—when export markets develop, competition among
intermediaries may beneﬁt farmers with higher oﬀered prices.
Policies that reduce trade costs and encourage marketing activities in rural areas may
be useful to facilitate exports and reduce poverty. Examples include roads, marketing
information, and measures that promote the development of market arrangements such as
FDI (in, for instance, coﬀee and tea plantations) or outgrower schemes (like the coﬀee alliance
initiative in Uganda). To boost these potential beneﬁts, it is important that these measures
be accompanied by enhanced access to international markets. These ﬁndings support the
recent emphasis on the “aid for trade” approach to development policy.
23Appendix A: Two Theoretical Results
We want to show that both the probability of specializing in export crops and expected income
are increasing in the number of intermediaries in a district. That is, that π(p,n) and Y (p,n)
from equations (8) and (9) are increasing in n when keeping p constant. Both equations can be
generically written as an integral of the form





















which is strictly positive for any function g strictly increasing in x.
In the case of the probability of specializing in export crops, π(p,n), g is equal to the probability
of specializing in export crops at a given distance x,





























which is also strictly increasing in x. Thus, both π(p,n) and Y (p,n) are strictly increasing in x,
the result we wanted to show.
Appendix B: Household and District Controls
Table A1 shows the results of the IV linear model of poverty on market density.
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An intermediary and its right competitor compete for farmers located in [0,1/n].
Some of these farmers choose to produce food crops. At given prices, the fraction of
farmers that sell export crops to intermediary i is given by the area to the left of e x
and above e A.
Figure 2
Equilibrium
Simulation of the Proﬁt Maximization and Zero Proﬁt combinations of price and
number of intermediaries under an exponential distribution of returns to export crops;
f(A) = λe−λA. The parameter values are: λ=0.2, R=4, δ=10, P∗=13, D=2, d=1.
27Figure 3
Export Crop Activity in Uganda
a) Coﬀee b) Tea
c) Cotton d) Passion fruit & Pineapple
The maps show the geographical distribution of export crop production in Uganda. They were built based on the
crop module from the Uganda National Household Survey (1999) and FAO Country Proﬁles and Mapping Information
System.
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The graphs report non-parametric regressions. The estimates are obtained with a Fan locally weighted linear
regression. We use a Gaussian kernel and bandwidths of 0.15, 0.15, and 0.05.
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The graph reports a non-parametric regression of the export price index on export
market density. The estimates are obtained with a Fan locally weighted linear
regression. We use a Gaussian kernel and bandwidths of 0.15.
30Table 1
Summary Statistics. Uganda National Household Survey
Average Std. Dev
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
Household size 5.67 3.05
Male heads 0.74 0.44
Married heads 0.71 0.45
Males 0.49 0.22
Age 18-45 0.30 0.23
Age 46- 0.16 0.26
Age 0-5 0.19 0.18
Age 6-12 0.22 0.18
Age 12-18 0.13 0.16
POVERTY
Monthly per capita expenditure (US$) 16.5 19.2
Urban poverty line (US$)1 18.9
Rural poverty line (US$)2 15.6
Poverty rate 35.2
EXPORT PARTICIPATION
Cultivated land (in acres) 2.57 3.52
Share of land in export crops 0.07 0.17
Share of income from export crops 0.08 0.17
HEALTH
Proportion of sick members 0.31 0.30
Proportion of sick children 0.25 0.34
Sick mother 0.22 0.42
Number of children 2.63 1.97
Sick mother * number of children 0.63 1.61
INCOME & ASSETS3
Remittances 0.48 0.50
Non-farm income 0.35 0.48
Animal assets 0.71 0.45
Equipment assets 0.99 0.08
Note: own calculations from the Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS)
1999/2000.
1. The urban poverty line is equivalent to 0.63 US dollars per day.
2. The rural poverty line is equivalent to 0.52 US dollars per day.
3. National averages are constructed from dichotomous variables at the household
level that indicate whether a household received remittances or not, etc.
31Table 2
Major Exports in Uganda (1999-2000)










Note: Uganda Bureau of Statistics.
Compiled by the Uganda Export Promotion
Board.
32Table 3
Summary Statistics: Uganda National Household Survey
Market Density and Village Controls
Average Std. Dev.
MARKET DENSITY
Export crops 0.37 0.31
Food 0.76 0.24
DISTRICT CONTROLS1
Distance to paved road 25.90 21.28
Access to credit 0.68 0.30
Access to improved seeds 0.58 0.28
Access to oxen 0.26 0.36
Access to oxen rental 0.21 0.31
Access to tractors 0.12 0.18
Access to extension services 0.38 0.24
Output market constraints 0.15 0.14
Input market constraints 0.16 0.12
Road constraints 0.05 0.08
Disease constraints 0.22 0.18
Security constraints 0.01 0.03
Land constraints 0.15 0.20
Credit constraints 0.04 0.08
Land fertility constraints 0.08 0.09
Access to veterinary services 0.28 0.26
Land conﬂict 0.13 0.12
Land community 0.08 0.23
Access to primary school 0.49 0.21
Free medicine 0.43 0.32
Election 0.11 0.18
Access to water 0.53 0.21
Public hospital 0.27 0.20
Private hospital 0.32 0.23
Note: own calculations from the Uganda National Household Survey
(UNHS) 1999/2000.
1. All district variables except distance to paved roads are constructed from
dichotomous variables at the community level.
33Table 4
Poverty and Market Density
Instrumental Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
IV - Linear Model
Export Market Density −0.56 −0.27 −0.28
(0.11)∗∗∗ (0.13)∗∗ (0.13)∗∗
Export Price Index – −0.01 −0.01
(0.009) (0.009)
Food Market Density – – −0.011
(0.02)
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes
District characteristics No Yes Yes
R2 0.11 0.21 0.21
First stage coeﬃcient −0.038 −0.027 −0.028
Standard error (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗
R2 0.37 0.76 0.77
IV - Probit
Export Market Density −1.71 −0.97 −0.98
Marginal eﬀect −0.62 −0.35 −0.35
Standard error (marg. eﬀects) (0.12)∗∗∗ (0.15)∗∗∗ (0.15)∗∗∗
R2 0.18 0.18 0.18
Observations 6734 6743 6743
Note: The dependent variables is a dichotomous indicator of whether the household is poor or
not. The main independent variable is export market density, which measures market availability
for export agriculture produce.
The ﬁrst panel reports results from 2SLS of poverty on market density. We report the coeﬃcient,
the cluster-corrected standard errors, the R2, and results from the ﬁrst stage regression. The
second panel report estimates from a probit model with endogenous regressor (using the control
function approach). We report the coeﬃcient, the marginal eﬀects with their cluster-corrected
standard errors, and the pseudo R2.
Based on the Uganda National Household Survey 1999/2000.
34Table 5
Export Participation and Market Density
Share of Land
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
IV – Linear Model
Coeﬃcient 0.30 0.18 0.18
Standard error (0.052)∗∗∗ (0.07)∗∗∗ (0.07)∗∗∗
R2 0.13 0.21 0.21
IV – Tobit
Marginal eﬀect 0.31 0.18 0.18
Standard error (0.040)∗∗∗ (0.052)∗∗∗ (0.050)∗∗∗
Observations 6554 6554 6554
Export Price Index No Yes Yes
Food Markets No No Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes
District characteristics No Yes Yes
Note: Export participation is measured with the share of land devoted to export crops
(coﬀee, tea, cotton, pineapples, passion fruit).
The ﬁrst panel shows results from 2SLS regressions of export participation on export market
density. The second panel shows MLE results from a Tobit speciﬁcation with endogenous
variables (using the control function approach). Standard errors (within parenthesis) are
cluster-corrected.
Based on the Uganda National Household Survey 1999/2000.
35Table 6
Export Participation and Market Density
Share of Income
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
IV – Linear Model
Coeﬃcient 0.29 0.14 0.14
Standard error (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗ (0.06)∗∗
R2 0.14 0.14 0.14
IV – Tobit
Marginal eﬀect 0.35 0.29 0.29
Standard error (0.057)∗∗∗ (0.049)∗∗∗ (0.049)∗∗∗
Observations 6606 6606 6606
Export Price Index No Yes Yes
Food Markets No No Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes
District characteristics No Yes Yes
Note: Export participation is measured with the share of income generated by export crops
(coﬀee, tea, cotton, pineapples, passion fruit).
The ﬁrst panel shows results from 2SLS regressions of export participation on export market
density. The second panel shows MLE results from a Tobit speciﬁcation with endogenous
variables (using the control function approach). Standard errors (within parenthesis) are
cluster-corrected.
Based on the Uganda National Household Survey 1999/2000.
36Table 7
Poverty and Export Participation
Instrumental Variables
Land Shares Income Shares
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
IV – Linear Model
Coeﬃcient −1.89 −1.50 −1.51 −1.68 −1.78 −1.79
Standard error (0.45)∗∗∗ (0.91)∗ (0.90)∗ (0.35)∗∗∗ (1.20) (1.20)
R2 0.15 0.21 0.21 0.15 0.21 0.21
IV – Probit
Coeﬃcient −5.75 −5.28 −5.33 −5.11 −6.04 −6.10
Marginal eﬀect −2.08 −1.91 −1.93 −1.81 −2.12 −2.14
Standard error (0.40)∗∗∗ (0.89)∗∗ (0.88)∗∗ (0.33)∗∗∗ (1.03)∗∗ (1.02)∗∗
R2 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.15
Observations 6734 6734 6734 6734 6734 6734
Export Price Index No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Food Markets No No Yes No No Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Note: Instrumental variable estimates of poverty on export participation. Poverty is deﬁned as a dichotomous variable of
whether the household is poor or not. Export participation is measured with the share of land devoted to export crops
(coﬀee, tea, cotton, pineapples, passion fruit) and with the share of income generated by sales of these crops. The linear
model is estimated with IV and the IV-Probit model is estimated with control function methods. Standard errors (within
parenthesis) are cluster-corrected.
Based on the Uganda National Household Survey 1999/2000.
37Table 8
Robustness to Set of Instruments
Two Instruments
Poverty Exports & Markets Poverty & Exports
& markets Share land Share income Share land Share income
(Model 3) (Model 3) (Model 3) (Model 3) (Model3)
IV – Linear Model −0.26 0.15 0.13 −1.45 −1.80
(0.11)∗∗ (0.06)∗∗ (0.05)∗∗ (0.89)∗ (1.19)
0.21 0.19 0.15 0.21 0.21
IV – Probit/Tobit −0.32 0.13 0.24 −1.86 −2.15
(0.013)∗∗ (0.024)∗∗∗ (0.047)∗∗∗ (0.90)∗∗ (1.02)∗∗
0.18 0.28 0.26 0.18 0.15
Test of Instruments
F-test (ﬁrst stage) 11.49 11.19 9.61 8.43 6.84
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 (ﬁrst stage) 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.21 0.16
Test of Overidentiﬁcation
χ2 0.178 0.773 0.765 0.290 0.029
P-value 0.673 0.379 0.382 0.591 0.865
Observations 6734 6554 6606 6554 6606
Note: Instrumental variable estimates using two instruments, the out-of-district cost of transportation to Kampala and
the lagged export market density in 1995. Poverty is deﬁned as a dichotomous variable of whether the household is poor
or not. Export participation is measured with the share of land devoted to export crops (coﬀee, tea, cotton, pineapples,
passion fruit) and with the share of income generated by sales of these crops. The linear model is estimated with IV and the
IV-Probit model is estimated with control function methods. Standard errors (within parenthesis) are cluster-corrected.
Based on the Uganda National Household Survey 1995/96 and 1999/2000.
38Table A1
Poverty and Market Density
Household and District Controls
Instrumental Variables Linear Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Household size 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗
Male head 0.008 0.035 0.035
(0.026) (0.022) (0.022)
Male married −0.0004 0.008 0.008
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Number of males 0.096 0.096 0.095
(0.029)∗∗∗ (0.027)∗∗∗ (0.027)∗∗∗
Age 12-18 0.295 0.289 0.288
(0.055)∗∗∗ (0.051)∗∗∗ (0.051)∗∗∗
Age 46+ 0.039 0.044 0.044
(0.033) (0.028) (0.028)
Age 0-5 0.251 0.233 0.233
(0.050)∗∗∗ (0.049)∗∗∗ (0.049)∗∗∗
Age 6-12 0.434 0.415 0.415
(0.054)∗∗∗ (0.054)∗∗∗ (0.054)∗∗∗
Literacy of head −0.089 −0.065 −0.065
(0.028)∗∗∗ (0.026)∗∗ (0.026)∗∗
Education (no schooling) −0.006 −0.004 −0.004
(0.074) (0.077) (0.077)
Education (primary incomplete) −0.016 −0.014 −0.014
(0.075) (0.076) (0.076)
Education (primary complete) −0.109 −0.1 −0.099
(0.079) (0.079) (0.078)
Education (junior incomplete) −0.186 −0.181 −0.181
(0.079)∗∗ (0.079)∗∗ (0.079)∗∗
Education (junior complete) −0.156 −0.15 −0.15
(0.083)∗ (0.092) (0.092)
Education (seniorr incomplete) −0.169 −0.159 −0.159
(0.071)∗∗ (0.071)∗∗ (0.070)∗∗
Education (junior complete) −0.325 −0.299 −0.298
(0.080)∗∗∗ (0.079)∗∗∗ (0.078)∗∗∗
Education (superior) 0.333 −0.257 −0.256
(0.109)∗∗∗ (0.095)∗∗∗ (0.095)∗∗∗
Health status (head) 0.026 −0.04 −0.04
(0.018) (0.013)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗
Note: Estimates of household and district controls from the model of poverty on export
market density. Instrumental variables. Standard errors within parenthesis (∗: signiﬁcant
at 10% level; ∗∗: signiﬁcant at 5% level; ∗ ∗ ∗: signiﬁcant at 1% level).
39Table A1 (continuation)
Poverty and Market Density: Household and District Controls
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Access to credit 0.005 0.004
(0.07) (0.07)
Access to improved seeds −0.05 −0.048
(0.058) (0.058)
Access to oxen 0.518 0.517
(0.122)∗∗∗ (0.122)∗∗∗
Access to oxen rental −0.319 −0.32
(0.105)∗∗∗ (0.105)∗∗∗
Access to tractors −0.036 −0.035
(0.068) (0.068)
Input market constraints −0.161 −0.159
(0.106) (0.106)
Road constraints −0.391 −0.385
(0.161)∗∗ (0.160)∗∗
Disease constraints −0.178 −0.18
(0.083)∗∗ (0.084)∗∗
Security constraints −0.007 −0.016
(0.308) (0.308)
Land constraints −0.193 −0.196
(0.083)∗∗ (0.083)∗∗
Credit constraints −0.014 −0.017
(0.197) (0.196)
Land fertility constraints −0.384 −0.382
(0.127)∗∗∗ (0.128)∗∗∗
Access to veterinary services 0.164 0.164
(0.055)∗∗∗ (0.055)∗∗∗
Land conﬂict 0.182 0.183
(0.084)∗∗ (0.084)∗∗
Land community −0.116 −0.121
(0.063)∗ (0.064)∗
Access to primary school 0.004 0.007
(0.061) (0.061)




Access to water 0.059 0.058
(0.055) (0.055)
Public hospital −0.069 −0.07
(0.092) (0.092)
Private hospital −0.124 −0.125
(0.069)∗ (0.069)∗
Observations 6734 6734 6734
R-squared 0.11 0.21 0.21
Note: Estimates of household and district controls from the model of poverty on
export market density. Instrumental variables. Standard errors within parenthesis
(∗: signiﬁcant at 10% level; ∗∗: signiﬁcant at 5% level; ∗∗∗: signiﬁcant at 1% level).
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